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Abstract 
 
This paper shows the utility of the elasticity of reported income to assess tax reforms in detail 
from the perspectives of tax revenue and well-being. We provide evidence of the value of the 
elasticity of reported income in Spain given the variations in marginal rates of the Personal 
Income Tax. The mean value of this parameter for the entire Spanish territory is 1,541. 
Nevertheless, we confirm the existence of considerable heterogeneity in the value of this 
elasticity depending on taxpayers’ characteristics. Based on these estimated elasticities, we 
make a detailed assessment of the impact of the recent increase in marginal tax rates that Spain 
approved in 2012. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have always been very interested in studying the effects of tax policies on 
the behavior of economic agents, as such policies can generate important distortions in 
the economy. In addition, the current debate on the opportunity to raise taxes to reduce 
public deficits has bestowed significant importance on the economic analysis of tax 
reforms. 
 
Traditionally, the response of individuals to changes in tax rates in the Personal Income 
Tax (PIT) has been assessed based solely on the effect on labor supply. However, in 
recent years, a new literature has emerged, known as New Tax Responsiveness, which 
considers this approach limited and incomplete because it does not account for many 
aspects of taxpayers’ behavior. As opposed to this partial analysis, which seeks only to 
study the effects on labor supply, this new literature seeks to measure the global 
response of economic agents to tax changes. Based on the pioneering work of Lindsey 
(1987) and Feldstein (1995), a whole range of papers has been created with the main 
objective of measuring responses of reported income to changes in marginal tax rates. 
Special mention must be made of Feldstein’s (1999) work, which shows how this 
elasticity allows the determination of tax revenue and efficiency implications due to tax 
rate alterations.  
 
Although there is extensive empirical literature aimed at determining this parameter in 
the United States
2
, there is scarce evidence for the case of Spain. Therefore, the aim of 
this research is to provide evidence related to the Spanish economy on the value of this 
elasticity. Likewise, the estimates obtained are used to illustrate the usefulness of this 
parameter for a detailed evaluation of PIT reforms. Specifically, we assess the effects of 
Spain’s 2012 PIT reform. To estimate this elasticity, we use microdata from the 
Taxpayers Panel for PIT, which was compiled by the Tax Agency and the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, corresponding to fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Those years were chosen 
for methodological reasons related to the need to identify two moments in time during 
which an exogenous change in tax rates occurred. This variability existed in 2006 and 
                                               
2An exhaustive review of the literature on this subject has been conducted by Slemrod (1998), Giertz 
(2004) and Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012). 
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2007, resulting from implementation of Law 35/2006, which has been in force since 
January 2007. That tax reform is the most recent one for which microdata are available.  
 
This paper has four additional sections. The second section presents the empirical model 
and the database. Section three reports the main results obtained in estimating the 
income elasticity. Section four uses elasticity estimates to assess the impact of Spain’s 
most recent PIT reform. Section five concludes.  
 
2. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
 
In this section, we present the empirical model used in estimating the elasticity of 
reported income along with the data used. 
 
2.1. Empirical Model 
 
The empirical model used was proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002), with subsequent 
modifications suggested by Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek (2008). The empirical model 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
iiii
C
i uZTMEy 
')1log()1log()log(   [1] 
 
where  represents the difference in the variable between 2007 and 2006, i.e., the year 
when the reform was implemented and the previous year. The variable iy  
represents 
reported income,  denotes the marginal tax rate, TME stands for the average tax rate, 
iZ   is a vector of control variables that include other characteristics of the individual that 
may have an effect on the size of his or her reported income, and iu  
represents the error 
term. The elasticity of reported income is  
C
, where C is the compensated 
elasticity and   is the income effect3.  
 
In line with the proposal of Auten and Carroll (1999), the control variables contained in 
                                               
3 Creedy (2014a) has highlighted that the specification in equation [1], extensively used in the empirical 
literature, relies on the strong assumption that virtual income can be neglected in the computation of the 
proportional change induce by a tax reform on the average tax rates. Creedy demonstrates that this 
assumption as highly unrealistic as it implies that marginal and average tax rates are equal.   
 4 
iZ   
include demographic variables (i.e., individual’s sex, age and age square), household 
characteristics (i.e., number of children, presence of handicapped persons and type of 
return) and other variables, including the origin and nature of income (i.e., whether 
taxpayer is a business owner or derives income primarily from wages). In addition, 
dummies were included that identified taxpayers’ regions of residence. This entire set of 
variables attempted to capture changes in reported income not caused by the marginal 
tax rate change.  
 
Thus, to control for the problem of mean reversion, the logarithm of the gross income 
from the pre-reform year (2006) was included as an additional regressor. If we had not 
controlled for the mean reversion, the estimation results could have been contaminated. 
Mean reversion arises when income fluctuates throughout a taxpayer’s life cycle in such 
a way that an unusually low or high income subsequently returns to its normal path. 
This return to the mean can be confused with a response to tax rates. Moreover, mean 
reversion is usually more pronounced at the tails of the income distribution, and 
therefore, as in other papers, to avoid biases in the estimates of the elasticity, we 
eliminated the lowest-income individuals.  
 
As is common in the literature, due to the endogeneity of the marginal and the average 
tax rates, equation [1] was estimated by Two-Stage Least Squares using as instruments 
what, in the literature, have been called the virtual marginal tax rate and the virtual 
average tax rate. These virtual tax rates are those paid by the taxpayer in the post-
reform year (2007) if his or her income coincided in real terms with the one obtained in 
the pre-reform year (2006). Appendix I describes how actual marginal and average tax 
rates together with their corresponding “virtual versions” have been constructed. As we 
show in the mentioned Appendix, the calculation of the tax rates has been conducted 
taking into account the peculiarities of Spain’s PIT4. 
 
 
                                               
4 Using the dynamics of taxable income over a period that involves no tax changes, Carey, Creedy, 
Gemmel and Teng (2012) suggest two attractive alternative tax rate instruments. Firstly, conditional on 
income in two periods before the tax change, the tax rate each taxpayer would face if income were equal 
to “expected income”. Secondly, the “expected tax rate” derived from the form of the conditional 
distribution of income. Initially we considered the implementation of these two other instruments but it 
was not viable for the reform under study, as in 2003 and 2004 Spain undertook additional tax changes 
that made them unsuitable. 
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2.2. Data 
 
We use tax return microdata for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, collected and prepared by 
the Spanish Tax Agency and the Institute for Fiscal Studies. We chose those years 
because, to be able to identify econometrically the elasticity sought, an exogenous 
change in the marginal tax rates is required. In our case, this tax change occurred in 
2007 with the implementation of Law 35/2006. To summarize, the most relevant 
aspects of this reform are as follows
5
: 
 
i. Family and personal circumstances became treated as tax deductions rather than 
personal and family allowances.  
 
ii. The dual structure of the tax was changed by modifying the taxable income 
definition. Specifically, before 2006, income was accumulated in two distinct taxable 
incomes: the special taxable income, which included capital gains generated during 
more than one year –taxed at a rate of 15%-, and the general taxable income, which 
included all other types of income (salaries, savings income, real estate capital, business 
income, income allocation and capital gains generated during a period of less than one 
year). With the 2006 reform, the special taxable income became known as the savings 
taxable income which included all yields from savings as well as all capital gains, 
regardless of when they were generated. This extended savings taxable income was 
taxed at a single rate, which rose from 15% to 18%.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the tax schedules and definitions of the taxable incomes for 2006 
and 2007. As can be observed, apart from the different taxable income definitions, the 
2007 tax band has three fundamental differences from its 2006 counterpart. First, the 
number of income brackets was reduced from five to four. Second, the minimum 
marginal tax rate rose from 15% to 24%, while the maximum marginal tax rate dropped 
from 45% to 43%. Nevertheless, both rates are not directly comparable because they 
were applied, as mentioned above, to different legal definitions of income. 
 
 
                                               
5In addition to the changes to the PIT for residents, Law 35/2006 incorporated partial changes to 
Corporation Tax and to PIT of Non-Residents. This research does not address those changes.  
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Table 1. Tax schedules and taxable income definitions in 2006 and 2007 
TAX YEAR 2006 
Taxable income taxed progressively: labour income; alimony; self-employment income; 
income from property, income from savings, short-term capital gains and income applications to 
shareholders proceeding from corporations under the fiscal transparency regime. 
Income Threshold 
(€) 
Central Govt 
MTR 
Regional Govt 
MTR 
Total 
MTR 
0 0.0906 0.0594 0.15 
4,161.60 0.1584 0.0816 0.24 
14,357.52 0.1868 0.0932 0.28 
26,842.32 0.2471 0.1229 0.37 
46,818.00 0.2916 0.1584 0.45 
Taxable income taxed proportionally: long-term capital gains (those generated in one year or 
more) 
0 0.0906 0.0594 0.15 
TAX YEAR 2007 
Taxable income taxed progressively: labour income; alimony; self-employment income; 
income from property and income applications to shareholders proceeding from corporations 
under the fiscal transparency regime. 
 
Income Threshold 
(€s) 
Central Govt 
MTR 
Regional Govt 
MTR 
Total 
MTR 
0 0.1566 0.0834 0.24 
17,360 0.1827 0.0973 0.28 
32,360 0.2414 0.1286 0.37 
52,360 0.2713 0.1587 0.43 
Taxable income taxed proportionally: capital gains of any type and any form of income 
derived from financial savings, such as interest rates from bank accounts and deposits, share 
dividends, bond interest or any other type of yield earned from debt saving instruments. 
0 0.111 0.069 0.18 
 
It should be noted that although the scenarios before and after the reform share a single 
definition of gross income, their definitions for taxable income differ significantly. 
Thus, for reforms such as the one analyzed here, in which the definition of the taxable 
income before and after the reform differs importantly, Kopczuk (2005) and Saez, 
Slemrod and Giertz (2012) suggest applying the broadest possible definition of income. 
Therefore, in this paper, we estimated the gross income elasticity (GIE) rather than the 
taxable income elasticity (TIE). If we had opted to estimate the TIE, our results would 
be less robust because TIE is a concept of income that is contaminated by the 
differences in the legal definition in the years before and after the reform. 
 
The database consists of 288,902 tax returns, with detailed information about reported 
income, tax due and socioeconomic characteristics of the tax unit
6
. The sample only 
                                               
6
To reduce the impact generated by the problem of mean reversion, we eliminated from the study those 
individuals whose 2006 income was below the Public Income Indicator of Multiple Effects (PIIME), 
which was 5,749.20 Euros.  
 7 
includes taxpayers with a positive gross income as well as a positive taxable income in 
both years
7
. Table 2 and Figure 1 show, by income deciles, the impact of the 2007 
reform on actual and virtual marginal tax rates. The results demonstrate that the reform 
raised the marginal tax rates of the lowest-income individuals, as opposed to what we 
observe for individuals who had the highest incomes. Likewise, for 2007, Figure 2 
shows sizeable differences between actual and virtual marginal tax rates. The 
illustration suggests that individuals changed their behavior to reduce the impact of the 
reform. This is particularly true in top-decile taxpayers, for whom substantial negative 
differences exist between actual and virtual marginal tax rates.  
Table 2. Average actual and virtual marginal tax rates by gross income decile 
 
Decile 
(I) (II) (III) 
Actual  
Marginal Tax Rate 
2006 
Actual  
Marginal Tax Rate 
2007 
Virtual 
Marginal Tax Rate 
1 0.154 0.223 0.234 
2 0.178 0.234 0.230 
3 0.215 0.239 0.234 
4 0.235 0.247 0.243 
5 0.260 0.266 0.266 
6 0.274 0.277 0.275 
7 0.318 0.311 0.312 
8 0.354 0.341 0.351 
9 0.411 0.374 0.397 
10 0.404 0.362 0.404 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 
7
In Appendix II, we include the definitions of the variables used. 
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Figure 1 
Difference in marginal tax rates 2007-2006 by gross income deciles (2006) 
 
 
Figure 2 
Difference between actual and virtual marginal tax rates in post-reform year 
(2007) 
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3. RESULTS 
 
As commented above, using the virtual versions of marginal and average tax rates as 
instruments (see Appendix I), the empirical model was estimated by Two-Stage Least 
Squares. Tests for these instruments -both the partial-R
2
 and F on excluded instruments- 
allowed us to accept their validity. As is typical of this literature, all estimates were 
obtained using sample weights. 
 
In columns (I)-(IV) of Table 3, we present the results of estimating the model without 
including the income effect. Gruber and Sáez (2002) is the first work to consider that the 
function of income depends on virtual income and thus they include the income effect. 
They find that this effect is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, previous 
literature does not include the income effect because compensated and non-
compensated elasticities are considered equal
8
 ( CERB  ). In column (I), we present 
the basic model including neither demographic variables nor the base-year income. In 
the model reported in column (II), the base year income is incorporated to control for 
mean reversion. As in Gruber and Saez (2002), Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) and Heim 
(2009), we observe that when the logarithm of the pre-reform income is not included a 
lower elasticity is obtained. This could be caused by the effect of the mean reversion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 Some works that include the income effect are Gottfried and Schellhorn (2004), Kopczuk (2005), 
Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek (2008), Gottfried and Witczak (2009), Kleven and Schultz (2012) and, for 
the case of Spain, Díaz (2004). 
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Table 3. Results of model estimation 
 
Controls 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
None Mean reversion  
Mean 
reversión 
+ 
Individual 
characteristics 
Mean Reversion 
by Deciles 
+ 
Individual 
characteristics  
Income 
Effect 
Income Effect  
+ 
Individual 
characteristics 
Intercept 
0.046 
(0,001) 
2.119 
(0.028) 
2.174 
(0.029) 
4.126 
(0.132) 
2.108 
(0.027) 
2.174 
(0.028) 
∆ log(1-τ) 
0.775 
(0,019) 
1.503 
(0.027) 
1.541 
(0.028) 
1.393 
(0.027) 
1.537 
(0.035) 
1.540 
(0.036) 
log(yt-1) 
 
- 
-0.204 
(0.003) 
-0.224 
(0.003) 
-0.431 
(0.015) 
-0.202 
(0.003) 
-0.224 
(0.003) 
∆ log(1-TME) - - - - 
-0.238 
(0.113) 
0.007(*) 
(0.119) 
Age - - 
0.006 
(0.0004) 
0.004 
(0.0004) 
- 
0.006 
(0.0004) 
Age2 - - 
-0.00005 
(3.5x10-6) 
-0.00003 
(3.4x10-6) 
- 
-0.00005 
(3.7x10-6) 
Joint - - 
-0.036 
(0.002) 
-0.032 
(0.002) 
- 
-0.036 
(0.002) 
Self-Employed - - 
-0.027 
(0.002) 
-0.023 
(0.002) 
- 
-0.027 
(0.002) 
Man - - 
0.041 
(0.002) 
0.041 
(0.002) 
- 
0.041 
(0.002) 
Number of Children - - 
0.035 
(0.001) 
0.033 
(0.001) 
- 
0.035 
(0.001) 
Disabled - - 
0.010 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.003) 
- 
0.009 
(0.003) 
Source - - 
-0.044 
(0.006) 
-0.018 
(0.006) 
- 
-0.044 
(0.006) 
Region - - Included Included - Included 
Mean reversion by 
deciles 
- - - Included - - 
2
k Overall significance 
(p-valor) 
1,026.68 
(0.00) 
5,529.78 
(0.00) 
6,729.14 
(0.00) 
8,547.00  
(0,00) 
5,725.59 
(0.00) 
6,796.64 
(0.00) 
Standard error of  
regression 
0.408 0.403 0.400 0.394 0.396 0.400 
First stage:        
Partial R2:       
      ∆log(1-τ) 0.489 0.447 0.434 0.402 0.459 0.446 
      ∆ log(1-TME) - - - - 0.084 0.077 
F on excluded 
instruments: 
  
 
 
  
      ∆log(1-τ) 193,194 160,344 148,818 131,664 82,672.9 76,314 
      ∆ log(1-TME) - - - - 7,400.97 6,482.69 
N 288,902 288,902 285,272 285,272 288,897 285,267 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. (*) Non significant at 10% 
 
When 2006 income is included -column (II)-, a positive elasticity of 1.503 is obtained. 
This value is greater than that obtained in other papers that have used the same 
specification. For example, Auten and Carroll (1999) have obtained elasticities ranging 
from 0.45 to 0.7, depending on the sample used and the control variables included. In 
Gruber and Saez (2002), elasticity fluctuates between 0.12 and 0.61, according to the 
explained variable and the method of controlling for mean reversion. Our results are in 
line with the values from Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000), who obtained elasticities 
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between 1.76 and 1.99 when using the Feldstein (1995) procedure. This also occurs in 
Kopczuk (2005), who gets an elasticity of 1.44 when controlling for mean reversion. 
With respect to Spain, our results are in line with those of Badenes (2001) and Díaz 
(2004). In Badenes (2001) the elasticity range is between 0.3 and 1.34 for the primary 
income earner in a marriage and between 0.71 and 2.08 for the second income earner. 
Díaz (2004) obtains maximum elasticities of up to 2.2 when using the Feldstein 
procedure. Conversely, Sanmartín (2007) and Díaz (2004) get much lower elasticities 
(between 0.1 and 0.7) when using Two-Stage Least Squares. The negative sign in pre-
reform income coincides with results in prior works such as Auten and Carroll (1999), 
Sillamaa and Veall (2001), Gruber and Saez (2002), Hansson (2007) and, for the case of 
Spain, Díaz (2004) and Sanmartín (2007). 
 
Column (III) shows the results of a model analogous to that in column (II) but including 
demographic variables, the type of income source and a set of region-of-residence 
dummies. The inclusion of these variables barely changes the elasticity, whose value 
becomes 1.541. From the estimation results it can be inferred that the higher the number 
of children, the number of handicapped people and the individual’s age, the greater the 
variation in income. The number of children is included to control for its effect on 
income growth, and a positive sign implies that with a larger number of children income 
variation is greater. This positive effect coincides with results obtained by a majority of 
the literature, including Auten and Carroll (1999), Sillamaa and Veall (2001), Gottfried 
and Schellhorn (2004), Auten, Carroll and Gee (2008), Heim (2009) and, for the case of 
Spain, Díaz (2004) and Sanmartín (2007). Age and its square value control for life cycle 
effects. A positive sign for age and a negative sign for its square imply that when age 
increases, so does income variation, but this positive effect diminishes with age. This 
behavior can be explained by the fact that income rises more during the first years of an 
individual’s career and becomes more stable over time. This result is consistent with 
Sillammaa and Veall (2001), Auten, Carroll and Gee (2008), Bakos, Benczur and 
Benedek (2008) and, for Spain, Díaz (2004). With respect to gender, the evidence 
shows that as in Giertz (2007), income variation is greater for men than for women. 
Likewise, income variation is lower in married couples that file jointly than for those 
who file separately. This is most likely because joint filing is more frequent in 
households with only one breadwinner, which show lower income variations.  
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For control variables that represent income source, self-employed individuals or those 
whose main source of income is labour show a lower variation in income. With respect 
to self-employed individuals both, Gottfried and Witczak (2009) and Sanmartín (2007), 
obtain the same results as in this paper. Additionally, regional dummies are jointly 
significant, as income variation is influenced by the behavior of the regional economy. 
 
In column (IV), the model is extended to include the interaction between the base-year 
income and income-decile dummies. According to Gruber and Saez (2002), this 
procedure allows to determine whether the mean reversion effect is non-linear, varying 
with income decile. As in Gruber and Saez (2002) and Giertz (2007) and Heim (2009), 
elasticity diminishes when we introduce these differences by income decile, amounting 
to 1.393. This fall in the estimated elasticity suggests that the variations in the level and 
in the distribution of income, related with other causes than tax variation, could cause 
an upward bias.  
 
In line with Gruber and Saez (2002) and Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek (2008), the 
variation )1log( TME  is included in columns V and VI
9
. This variable separates the 
income effect from the substitution effect. We obtain a negative income effect, 
however, as in Gruber and Saez (2002), this effect is not statistically significant when 
control variables are considered -column VI-. In the literature, the empirical evidence on 
the sign and size of this income effect is not conclusive, as the results vary depending 
on the group of individuals analyzed. Thus, for example, Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek 
(2008) differentiate the income effect by income brackets and find that it is only 
significant, with a negative sign, in the highest income ranges. In Gottfried and Witczak 
(2009) and Kleven and Schultz (2012), the income effect is significant and negative but 
only for wage earners, whereas it is positive and non-significant for the self-employed. 
In addition, it is worth noting that, in the absence of control variables, the compensated 
elasticity is 1.503 whereas it reaches 1.54 when they are included. Moreover, as can be 
seen, all control variables are significant and have the same signs as those shown in 
column (III). 
 
 
                                               
9 Column V exhibits the model without control variables whereas column VI reports results with control 
variables as those used in column III. 
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3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In order to analyze whether there are differences in the elasticity of declared income 
among individuals, we estimate this elasticity by income levels, region of residence, age 
group, income source, gender, return type and category of primary income source. The 
results are presented in Table 4
10
. 
 
As for the estimates of gross income elasticity by income quartiles, the elasticity is 
0.664 for the first quartile, for the second, it is 1.002, 1.365 for the third, and 2.717 for 
the last one. Differences among these elasticities are statistically significant. Namely, 
we confirm that reported income elasticity is positively related to income level
11
. This 
pattern is found in most of the literature (see, e.g., Gruber and Saez (2002), Giertz 
(2010) and Claus, Creedy and Teng (2012)). This result is expected as, to a large extent, 
the design of tax strategies are positively correlated with income.  Conversely, in the 
low-income groups, in which labor is the main source of income, tax planning is less 
prone. Therefore, as found in Heim (2009), low-income groups have elasticities that are 
lower and even non-significant. In the case of Spain, Diaz (2004) and Badenes (2001) 
find that the elasticity varies by income level, but they do not find the same clear 
upward trend as this paper does. 
 
In block B of Table 4, we present estimates of elasticity of gross income by region of 
residence. The results show that the elasticity estimated for Madrid is 1.641. Only 
Catalonia, Murcia and Valencia have greater elasticities (1.70, 1.807 and 1.722, 
respectively) although there are no significant differences
12
. For the rest of the regions, 
elasticities range from 0.818 for Ceuta and Melilla to 1.453 for Andalucía. The results 
suggest that the richest regions (Madrid, Catalonia and Valencia) have the largest 
elasticities.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10Although models such as those from columns (III) and (VI) of Table 3 were estimated, we only present 
the results assuming that the income effect is nil, because it was not significant in any case. The results of 
the estimates are presented in Appendix III. 
11See column (I), Table A.III.1, Appendix III. 
12
See column (II), Table A.III.1, Appendix III. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity analysis: Elasticities by individual characteristics 
 
 
Elasticities 
Basic Model 1.541 
A.-Income:  
First quartil 0.664 
Second quartil 1.002 
Third quartil 1.364 
Fourth quartil 2.717 
B.- Region:  
Andalusia 1.453 
Aragon 1.304 
Asturias 1.424 
Balearic Islands 1.597 
Canary Islands 1.396 
Cantabria 1.192 
Castile-La Mancha 1.276 
Castile-Leon 1.285 
Catalonia 1.700 
Extremadura 1.267 
Galicia 1.435 
Madrid 1.641 
Murcia 1.807 
Rioja 1.473 
Valencia 1.722 
Ceutaand Melilla 0.818 
C.- Age:  
under 35 1.118 
between 36 and 55 1.654 
between 56 and 65 1.590 
over 65 1.588 
D.- Income source:  
Labor 0.524 
Other 1.548 
E.- Gender:  
Men 1.510 
Women 1.598 
F.- Self-Employed:  
Self-Employed 1.632 
Other 1.501 
G.- Type of tax return:  
Separately 1.582 
Jointly 1.450 
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In relation to age groups, we estimate the elasticity for the following age segments: 
under 35, between 36 and 55, between 56 and 65 and over 65. The estimated elasticity 
for people under 35 years of age is 1.118. The differences among this youngest group 
and the rest of the age segments are statistically significant. To be specific: the elasticity 
reaches 1.654 for taxpayers between 36 and 55, 1.59 for people between 56 and 65 and 
1.588 for individuals over 65
13
. However, we find no significant differences in 
elasticities among individuals over 35 years of age
14
. In other words, our results show 
that before 35 years of age, elasticity is lower. This result can be explained by the fact 
that labor income is the most relevant source of income in this youngest group of 
taxpayers. This heterogeneity due to age segments is in line with Diaz (2004) for Spain 
and Hansson (2007) for Sweden. 
 
As in Diaz (2004) and Carey, Creedy, Gemmel and Teng (2012), elasticities according 
to income source are estimated
15
 –block D-. Results show that individuals whose main 
source of income is labor have an elasticity equal to 0.524, as opposed to an elasticity of 
1.548 for other sources of income
16
. This difference may be caused by the fact that labor 
income is more difficult to manipulate for fiscal purposes. In other words, the only way 
to adjust wages is to modify hours of work, but empirical evidence shows that hours of 
work are quite rigid.   
 
As to gender, results indicate that women are slightly more sensitive to tax variations 
than men -1.598 and 1.510, respectively-
17
. This is an expected outcome as, in Spain, 
women are normally the second income-earners within the household. This result 
coincides with Blomquist and Selin (2010) for Sweden and Badenes (2001) for Spain.  
 
In block F, elasticity estimates for self-employed separated from the rest of the 
taxpayers are reported. The self-employed have a slightly higher elasticity, 1.632 as 
                                               
13See column (III), Table A.III.1, Appendix III. 
14
When conducting the equality contrast for elasticities in individuals over 35 years of age, we obtain a 
Wald statistic of 1.95 with a p-value of 0.376. 
15See the results of the model estimates in column (IV), Table A.III.1, Appendix III. 
16Carey, Creedy, Gemmel and Teng (2012) estimate for New Zealand an elasticity of 0.414 for 
individuals whose prime source of income is labor income and 0.909 for others, whereas Diaz (2004) 
finds for Spain that the elasticity for individuals whose income is derived primarily from work is 
approximately half of the elasticity for others. 
17
See column (V), Table A.III.1, Appendix III. 
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opposed to 1.501, with a statistically significant difference
18
. This is an expected result 
as self-employed have more “flexibility” than wage earners to adjust their taxable 
income to changes in tax rates. This finding coincides with Sillamaa and Veall (2001) 
for Canada and Díaz (2004) for Spain.  
 
Finally, we present estimates by type of tax return. As we can see, the elasticity of 
taxpayers who file separately is greater than that of those who file jointly
19
-1.582 as 
opposed to 1.450-. This result is not easy to interpret because the individuals who 
choose to file separately include both single and married people, who normally file 
separate returns. Nevertheless, when the model is estimated only for married 
individuals, the same results are obtained. This indicates that the response to tax 
changes is lower for marriages in which the spouses file jointly than for those who file 
separately. The reason for this may be that the option to file jointly is only chosen by 
tax units that have only one income earner or where there are two or more earners with 
a significant difference in spousal incomes. 
 
3.2. Broadening the Sample: Individuals with a Zero Taxable Income in 2006 
 
Taxpayers with zero taxable income in one of the analyzed years are usually excluded 
from the estimates. This was the procedure followed to obtain the results shown in 
previous sections. Nevertheless, our database includes tax returns with a zero taxable 
income in 2006 but not in 2007. Therefore, we considered it interesting to estimate the 
model with a broader sample to include these taxpayers, for an additional 20,339 tax 
returns. In Table 5, we present the results of the model without including the income 
effect. In column (I), we estimate a single common elasticity for all individuals, whereas 
in column (II), we estimate elasticities by income quartiles. As we see in column (I), the 
elasticity estimate is very sensitive to the inclusion of these taxpayers and changes from 
1.541 to 0.602. In column (II), we obtain an elasticity of 0.189 for the first quartile, 
0.499 for the second, 1.302 for the third and 2.705 for the fourth. If we compare these 
elasticities with those obtained from the restricted sample (0.664, 1.002, 1.364 and 
2.717), we observe that the inclusion of these zero-tax base returns really has an effect 
on the elasticity estimates for the lower and middle-income groups. This analysis 
                                               
18See column (VI), Table A.III.1, Appendix III. 
19
 See column (VII), Table A.III.1, Appendix III. 
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reflects the enormous sensitivity of the estimated elasticities to sample selection, which 
is reflected in the broadly available evidence -Gruber and Saez (2002), Kopczuk  
(2005), Heim (2009) or Giertz (2010)-. 
 
Table 5. Results of Model Estimation (Extended sample) 
 
 
(I) (II) 
Intercept 
1.992 
(0.028) 
1.912 
(0.027) 
∆ log(1-τ) 
0.602 
(0.019) 
0.189 
(0.019) 
∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-2 - 
0.310 
(0.033) 
∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-3 - 
1.113 
(0.055) 
∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-4 - 
2.516 
(0.050) 
log(yt-1) 
-0.207 
(0.003) 
-0.201 
(0.003) 
2
k overall significance (p-value) 
6,854.8 
 (0.000) 
9,055.40 
 (0.000) 
Standard error of regression 0.399 0.403 
First stage:    
Partial R2:   
             ∆ log(1-τ) 0.647 0.649 
      ∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-2 - 0.617 
      ∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-3 - 0.249 
      ∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-4 - 0.463 
F on excluded instruments:   
             ∆ log(1-τ) 484,134 156,074 
      ∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-2 - 34,519.2 
      ∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-3 - 4,867.57 
      ∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-4 - 14,147.5 
N 305,611 305,611 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. (*) Non significant at 10%. Models include as 
regressors: age and square, joint, self-employed, man, number of children, disabled, source and 
region of residence. 
 
  
 18 
4. APPLICATIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORMS 
 
The income elasticity to marginal tax rates has become an indispensable element for 
assessing tax reforms, especially in the case of the PIT. According to the findings of 
Saez (2004), Giert (2009) and Creedy (2011), the use of income elasticity does not limit 
the study of tax reform to revenue effects but extends it to the analysis of well-being 
and efficiency, allowing, for example, quantification of the Equivalent Variation or the 
change in the excess burden of taxation. In this section, the elasticities estimated in 
previous sections are used to analyze the impact of Royal Decree-Law 20/2011, which 
Spain implemented in January 2012 and caused a very significant rise in the marginal 
tax rates. As we have seen, beginning in January 2007, the Spanish PIT has had a dual 
structure that categorizes taxpayers’ savings income separately from other types of 
income. As illustrated in Table 6, the implementation of Royal Decree-Law 20/2011 
significantly raised marginal tax rates applicable to both the general tax base and to the 
savings tax base. Namely, marginal tax rates grew steadily for both tax bases. 
Specifically, in the general tax base, the marginal tax rate of the first income bracket 
was raised by 0.75 percentage points, while the last income segment saw its rate raised 
by seven percentage points. That is, in relative terms, marginal rates were raised 
between 3.13% for taxpayers in the lowest bracket to 15.56% for taxpayers in the 
highest band. With respect to savings tax base, the increasing range went from two 
points in the lowest bracket (10.52%) to six points in the highest band (28.57%). 
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Table 6. Increase in marginal tax rates approved by the Royal Decree-Law  
20/2011  
 
Taking 2012 as the reference year, in the empirical analysis below, we show some 
empirical applications of the tax base elasticity in analyzing tax reforms. Specifically, 
based on the estimated elasticities, we determine, for Royal Decree-Law 20/2011, the 
decrease that it caused in the reported tax base, the effective revenue effect, the impact 
on well-being, the efficiency costs and the distribution of marginal tax rates that would 
have maximized revenue in the pre-reform scenario (i.e., Laffer marginal tax rate). To 
do so, we simulated this regulatory change using a sample of 1,928,494 tax returns, 
representative of a population of 19,315,353 tax returns. The calculations were 
conducted based on the estimated regional gross income elasticities compiled in Table 
4. The conversion of gross income elasticities into tax base elasticities is explained in 
Appendix IV.   
 
4.1 Impact on Reported Taxable Income 
 
Taxable income elasticity other than zero implies that changes in the marginal tax rate 
induce modifications to the size of taxpayers’ reported tax bases. This is a consequence 
of the existing endogeneity between reported taxable income and marginal tax rates. 
Therefore, the first natural application of the estimated elasticities is to determine the 
variation in the magnitude of the reported taxable income that would be expected with 
GENERAL TAXABLE INCOME 
Tax Brackets 
(in €) 
Marginal Tax Rate 
2011 (%) 
Marginal Tax Rate 
2012 (%) 
Change  in Marginal Tax 
Rates 
0 - 17,707.20 24 24.75 3.13% 
17,707.20 - 33,007.20 28 30 7.14% 
33,007.20 - 53,407.20 37 40 8.11% 
53,407.20 - 120,000 43 47 9.30% 
120,000 - 175,000 44 49 11.36% 
175,000 - 300,000 45 51 13.33% 
> 300.000 45 52 15.56% 
SAVINGS TAXABLE INCOME 
Tax Brackets 
(in €) 
Marginal Tax Rate 
2011 (%) 
Marginal Tax Rate 
2012 (%) 
Change  in Marginal Tax 
Rates 
0 - 6,000 19 21 10.52% 
6,000 - 24,000 21 25 19.05% 
> 24,000 21 27 28.57% 
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implementation of Royal Decree-Law 20/2011. This calculation can be conducted 
individually for each taxpayer, and subsequently, the individual responses can be added 
up to obtain the population value. Specifically, for a given taxpayer   the expected 
reduction in his or her taxable income as a consequence of raising his or her maximum 
marginal tax rate,  , is provided by the following expression: 
 
                  
          [2] 
 
where     represents the pre-reform tax base,           
  indicates the elasticity of the tax 
base of taxpayer   and     represents the variation, in percentage points, of   . For the 
aggregated population, equation [2] becomes 
   
       ̅    ̃          
        [3] 
 
where   ̅   denotes the mean taxable income of the    taxpayers whose taxable income 
is within the bracket h with  ̃          
 representing the mean value of the elasticity of 
the taxable income characterizing these taxpayers. 
 
 Table 7 compiles the impact on the size of the reported taxable income. In 
population terms, the total reduction in the reported tax base for non-saving income is 
24,118 billion Euros, whereas the reduction in the savings taxable income is 8,475 
billion Euros. As can be observed, the most significant relative decrease in taxable 
income occurs in the final bracket. However, relative to overall taxable income the 
highest reduction happens in the initial and intermediate brackets. This is so because 
these non-top brackets contain a larger number of taxpayers. 
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Table 7. Change in reported taxable incomes induced by Royal Decree-Law  
20/2011 
GENERAL TAXABLE INCOME 
 Absolute reduction Relative reduction (%) 
 
(billions €) In the bracket  Over Total 
bracket 1 -2,992 -3.01 -0.86 
bracket 2 -8,377 -7.14 -2.42 
bracket 3 -5,465 -8.26 -1.58 
bracket 4 - 4,468 -9.84 -1.29 
bracket 5 -843 -12.54 -0.24 
bracket 6 -1,973 -16.91 -0.57 
Total Taxable 
Income -24,118 - 6.96 
SAVINGS TAXABLE INCOME 
 Absolute reduction Relative reduction (%) 
 
(billions €) In the bracket  Over Total 
bracket 1 -1,019 -10.40 -2.72 
bracket 2 -7,455 -26.96 -19.90 
Total Taxable 
Income -8,475 -22.62 
 
 
4.2. Revenue Impact: Mechanical and Behavioral Effects 
 
 Using estimates of taxable income elasticity, Creedy (2011) and Creedy and 
Gemmell (2013) analyzes in detail how to determine the revenue impact of a tax change 
in complex multistep income tax functions. Given a tax change, the existing literature 
distinguishes two types of responses: (i) a mechanical response and (ii) a behavioral 
response. The former measures revenue consequences under the unlikely assumption 
that the process of generating income is independent of the magnitude of the marginal 
tax rate. The latter includes the revenue effect associated with the existing endogeneity 
between reported income and the marginal tax rate. The mechanical and behavioral 
responses move in different directions and together allow quantification of the effective 
revenue impact that would be expected from a tax reform. Specifically, under the 
current design of the Spanish PIT, Sanz (2013) determines that the revenue change 
induced by the modification of marginal rate    can be precisely determined by the 
following expression: 
   {([  ̅                     
 ]  [  ̅        
              
  ]) 
                     
  
    
  ̃         ̅    }                 [4]  
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where  ̃        is the mean elasticity of the taxable income of taxpayers in bracket  , 
and    y      represent the income thresholds that define bracket   and  ̅  and ̅  stand 
for the arithmetic mean of the taxable incomes and applicable allowances. The 
population size affected by the change of marginal tax rates is included in   ,   
 ,   
  
and   
  , where     represents the number of taxpayers whose taxable income is within 
bracket   and   
  indicates the number of taxpayers with taxable incomes over     .  
  
  y   
  are the same population items but refer to the value of personal and family 
allowances. 
 
 The first part of equation [4], extracted in equation [5], is the Mechanical Effect 
(ME), which quantifies the variation in revenue assuming the absence of behavioral 
changes: 
 
       [  ̅                     
 ] 
 [  ̅        
              
  ]        [5] 
 
The second part of equation [4], which is replicated in equation [6], is the Behavioral 
Effect (BE) which quantifies the part of the mechanical response that is lost as a 
consequence of the induced behavior changes: 
 
         
  
    
  ̃         ̅           [6] 
 
The result of applying equations [5] and [6] to our sample of tax returns is summarized 
in Table 8. Focusing our attention on the general taxable income, if we analyze the final 
impact in more detail, we can see that only the increase in the first and second marginal 
tax rates generates additional revenue. The remainder of the increased marginal tax rates 
generates revenue losses compared to the pre-reform scenario. With respect to the 
savings tax schedule, going from two to three brackets explains all of the tax revenue 
gains associated with this type of income. Furthermore, the increase in the first marginal 
tax rate reduces tax revenue by nearly 26 million Euros. 
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Table 8. Tax Revenue Impact induced by Royal Decree-Law  20/2011( mechanical 
effect, behavioral effect y final effect) –in €- 
 
 As proven here, when only    of the reform is considered, tax revenue rises to 
5.4 billion Euros: 4.2 billion from the general taxable income and 1.17 billion from the 
savings tax base. However, when we also consider   , 5.2 billion Euros are lost due to 
efficiency losses, resulting in an effective increase in  tax revenue of only 152 million 
Euros (-563 million from non-savings income and 715 million from savings). In other 
words, 97.18% of the mechanical revenue gains are lost due to inefficiencies generated 
by the increased marginal tax burden. Contrary to government statements claiming that 
Royal Decree-Law 20/2011 would lead to revenue gains in 2012 of 5.4 billion Euros, 
our calculations (152 million Euros) reflect a more trustworthy number as, according to 
the executed budget in 2012, the PIT revenue reached 815 million Euros. Everything 
seems to point to the fact that government projections focused their analysis only on the 
ME, leaving out the BE. 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL TAXABLE INCOME 
Marginal Tax 
Rate 
Mechanical Effect 
     
 Behavioral Effect* 
            
 
  
  
    
         
Final Effect 
   883,062,094 
 226,731,486 0.2568      656,330,607  
   1,347,231,402  912,213,174 0.6771     435,018,228  
   793,172,269  1,187,554,223 1.4972  -  394,381,953  
   677,096,923  1,449,476,345 2.1407  -   772,379,422  
   141,192,788  291,445,069 2.0642  -   150,252,281  
   388,077,056  725,095,785 1.8684  -   337,018,729  
Whole 
Population 4,229,832,532 
 
4,792,516,082 1.1330   -    562,683,550  
SAVINGS TAXABLE INCOME 
Marginal Tax 
Rate 
Mechanical Effect 
     
 Behavioral Effect* 
            
 
  
  
    
         
Final Effect 
   19,490,258  45,435,781 2.3312 - 25,945,523 
   1,155,548,867  414,542,478 0.3587 741,006,388 
Whole 
Population  1,175,039,125 
 
459,978,259 0.3915 715,060,865 
Both Taxable 
Incomes 
5,404,871,657  5,252,494,341 0.9718 152,377,315 
Note: 
* A positive behavioral effect implies a tax revenue reduction 
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4.3. The Elasticity of the Taxable Income, Well-Being and Efficiency 
 
 Economic theory states that increasing the marginal tax burden may lead to 
important efficiency costs. Feldstein (1995, 1999) suggests that the total deadweight 
loss (   ) effectively generated by the PIT should be calculated based on the elasticity 
of the taxable income, as expressed in equation [7]: 
 
        
 ̅ 
    ̅ 
  ̃          
     ̅     [7] 
 
where    stands for the total number of taxpayers,  ̅  is the mean taxable income and  ̅ 
denotes the mean marginal tax rate. Computation of equation [7] indicates that the 
efficiency cost associated with the Royal Decree-Law 20/2011 reached to 3 billion 
Euros annually. In addition, authors such as Saez (2004), Giertz (2009) or Creedy (2011 
and 2014b) recognize that the decomposition of    and    is particularly informative 
because the value of    coincides with the Equivalent Variation, whereas    is the 
variation in the deadweight loss. That is, this decomposition informs us about not only 
the revenue impact of a tax change but also its allocative effects (efficiency). 
Considering that fact, the marginal welfare cost (   ) of a given tax reform, defined 
as the ratio between the change in the excess burden and the revenue variation, is given 
by
20
: 
 
    
  
     
     [8] 
 
Likewise, based on equation [8], it is possible to quantify the Marginal Cost of Public 
Funds (    ) associated with a tax reform, defined as      . 
 
4.4. The Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate 
 
 Another application of the taxable income elasticity is the calculation of the 
marginal tax rate that would maximize tax revenue. As highlighted by Creedy and 
Gemmell (2014) for the case of New Zealand, this revenue-maximizing marginal tax 
                                               
20
This expression is only valid when       which leads to     ⁄   . 
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rate, known in the literature as the Laffer marginal tax rate, is identified with the 
marginal tax rate that assures a zero revenue variation in function       . This 
condition is met when    and    are equal. Therefore, given the specific features of 
the Spanish PIT included in equations [5] and [6], we can calculate the Laffer marginal 
tax rate for each tax unit and study its distribution, along with determining the 
percentage of tax units and the volume of total taxable income and tax due that are 
located in the rising or decreasing sections of the Laffer curve. Table 9 presents this 
information for the reform under study. As can be seen, for the general taxable income, 
more than 68% of the tax returns are found in the decreasing section of the curve, 
comprising 72.29% of the reported tax base and 79.92% of net tax collected. For the 
case of savings these numbers vary significantly: more than 95% of the tax returns are 
located in the falling section of the Laffer curve affecting a smaller percentage of the 
reported taxable income (30.53%), albeit a bigger proportion of the tax due (83.82%). 
Table 9 offers this information broken down by tax brackets. 
Table 9. Relevance of the Laffer Effect in terms of the number of tax returns and 
volume of taxable income and tax due located in the decreasing section of the 
Laffer Curve by the time Royal Decree-Law 20/2011 came into force. 
GENERAL TAXABLE INCOME 
  ̅        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (
    
 
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
%TAX RETURNS 
BE > ME 
%TAXABLE INCOME 
BE > ME 
%TAX DUE 
BE > ME 
in 
bracket 
over 
 total 
in 
bracket 
over 
 total 
in 
bracket 
over 
 total 
bracket 1 0.24 0.2651 
  
57.9 36.3 33.44 9.59 19.2 2.63 
bracket 2 0.28 0.2077 7.2 25.82 79.75 20 75.58 25.6 73.1 22.33 
bracket 3 0.37 0.1476 22.2 60.11 99.84 8.51 99.79 19.1 99.8 23.09 
bracket 4 0.43 0.1878 24.2 56.33 99.67 3.27 99.5 13 99.5 21.09 
bracket 5 0.44 0.1191 32.1 72.92 100 0.25 100 1.94 100 3.91 
bracket 6 0.45 0.2836 16.6 36.97 97.68 0.17 92.12 3.1 92.2 6.86 
All 0.3142 0.2109 10.3 27.25 68.5 72.29 79.92 
SAVINGS TAXABLE INCOME 
  ̅        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (
    
 
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
%TAX RETURNS 
BE > ME 
%TAXABLE INCOME 
BE > ME 
%TAX DUE 
BE > ME 
in 
bracket 
over 
 total 
in 
bracket 
over 
 total 
in 
bracket 
over 
 total 
bracket 1 0.19 0.0288 16.1 84.82 98.68 93.6 93 24.3 99.9 81.05 
bracket 2 0.21 0.4149 -21 -97.56 31.61 1.63 8.38 6.18 14.7 2.77 
All 0.2048 0.3138 -11 -49.82 95.21 30.53 83.82 
Notes: 
 ̅ = average of the actual marginal tax rate. 
  =average of the Laffer marginal tax rate. 
  = behavioral effect. 
  = mechanical effect. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The elasticity of reported income to marginal tax rates is an indispensable parameter in 
the economic analysis of tax reforms. Accurate knowledge of this elasticity allows for 
evaluating various aspects of a tax change, such as induced variation in reported 
income, effective revenue impact, efficiency implications and even the marginal tax rate 
that would maximize tax revenue once behavioral taxpayer reactions are taken into 
account. 
 
This paper estimates the elasticity of reported income for Spain. The estimated mean 
value of this key parameter for the whole Spanish territory is 1.541. Nevertheless, a 
considerable heterogeneity in this elasticity is detected, depending on factors such as 
taxpayer income level, age, gender, income type, tax return type and region of 
residence. Accordingly, changes in marginal tax rates will have heterogeneous effects 
on different individuals. Specifically, we find that the higher the level of income of the 
taxpayer the higher is the average elasticity (0.664 for individuals in the first quartile 
compared with 2.717 in the last quartile). Moreover, older individuals, women, those 
who obtain their income mainly from non-labour sources, the self-employed and 
taxpayers filing separately demonstrate greater sensitivity. We also find that individuals 
who live in richer regions (Madrid, Catalonia and Valencia) are, on average, more 
reactive to marginal tax rates than those who live in poorer regions (Ceuta and Melilla, 
Extremadura or both Castillas). Armed with these estimated elasticities, the recent 
increase in the marginal rates approved in Spain in 2012 has been assessed.  
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Appendix I. Obtaining Marginal and Average Tax Rates 
 
To estimate equation [1], it is necessary to accurately define the notion of marginal tax 
rate. To do so, we must take into account that the two PIT structures analyzed, for 2006 
and 2007, have a schedular multi-rate structure. Both structures distinguish two types of 
taxable income: (i) savings income, which is subject to a single tax rate, and (ii) other 
income categories, which are taxed progressively. Nevertheless, the 2007 reform 
introduced important changes both in the way these two types of income are computed 
and in the applicable tax schedules. Therefore, for each year considered, we identified 
two types of relevant marginal tax rates: the marginal tax rate of the progressive tax 
schedule ( PG ) and the proportional tax rate ( P ). Thus, for each year t, each taxpayer i 
would pay an effective weighted marginal tax rate ( ) equal to: 
 
2007,2006,
,,
,
,
,,
,
, 



 t
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X
XX
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tiP
ti
PG
ti
P
tiPG
tiP
ti
PG
ti
PG
ti
ti    [A.1] 
   
where
P
tiX ,  represents for year t the size of the taxable income that is taxed 
proportionally and PGtiX , represents the taxable income taxed progressively. Given the 
existing endogeneity between marginal rate and income, we instrument   based on 
what is known in the literature as the virtual marginal tax rate, V . The virtual marginal 
tax rate is defined as the marginal tax rate applicable for the taxpayer in 2007 for the 
real constant value of his or her income in 2006. To construct this instrument, V , we 
indexed all 2006 income sources with the corresponding consumption price index 
published by the National Statistics Institute (INE) that year, which amounted to 4.2%, 
and recalculated the corresponding amount as if the 2006 indexed income would be 
taxed according to 2007 regulations. Once we calculated the virtual marginal tax rate for 
all taxpayers, to obtain a relevant V , we applied the same procedure of weighting 
referred to in [A.1]. The average tax rates applied to individuals were calculated as: 
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                         [A.2] 
 
where       represents for year t the tax due by each individual and tiy ,  is the gross 
income. The mean of the average tax rates -actual and virtual- of each individual were 
constructed using the same procedure as the one described above for marginal tax rates. 
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Appendix II. Definition of the Variables  
 
Reported gross income: 
 Total gross income, in both money and in kind, proceeding from any income 
source of the tax unit. It includes labour income, income from savings and real 
estate capital income, capital gains and imputed income, and similarly business 
income. 
 
Marginal tax rate: 
 Rate of marginal taxation, representative of the tax unit, obtained by the 
weighting given in equation [A.1]. 
 
Virtual marginal tax rate: 
 Imaginary marginal tax rate constructed for 2006 income (indexed for inflation) 
when 2007 PIT is applied. 
 
Average Tax Rate: Average tax paid by the tax unit as defined in [A.2] and obtained by 
using the weighting included in equation [A.1]. 
 
Virtual Average Tax Rate: 
 Figurative average tax rate that would correspond to 2006 income (duly indexed 
for inflation) when applying 2007 regulations. 
Age: 
 Age in years, on December 31 of the fiscal year, of the head of the tax unit. 
Joint: 
 Dummy variable that identifies whether the tax unit filed jointly or separately, 
which assumes a value of 1 if filed jointly and 0 if separate. 
Self-Employed: 
 Dummy variable identifying whether the taxpayer unit’s gross income contains 
income streams derived from professional or business activity. Assumes a value 
of 1 if there are professional and/or business activities and 0 if there are none. 
Man: 
Dummy variable identifying the gender of the taxpayer that assumes a value of 1 
if the individual is a man and 0 if she is a woman. 
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Number of Children: 
 Variable containing the number of children in the tax unit. Children 
corresponding to marriages in which spouses file separately are imputed at 50%. 
Disabled: 
 Total number of handicapped persons in the tax unit. Handicapped persons 
corresponding to married couples filing separately are imputed at 50%. 
Source: 
 Dummy variable determining whether labour income is the main source of 
income of the tax unit. Assumes a value of 1 if the main source is labour income 
and 0 if the main source is another type of income. 
 
Regional Dummy Variables: 
 Variable that identifies the tax unit’s region of residence: 1—Andalucia, 2—
Aragon, 3—Principality of Asturias, 4—Balearic Islands, 5—Canary Islands, 
6—Cantabria, 7—Castilla-La Mancha, 8—Castilla-Leon, 9—Catalonia, 10—
Extremadura, 11—Galicia, 12—Madrid, 13—Murcia, 16—La Rioja, 17—
Valencia, 18—Ceuta and Melilla. 
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Apendix III. Sensibility Analysis: Elasticity of Reported Gross Income by 
Individual Characteristics 
 
Tabla A. III. 1. Results of model estimation 
 
 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Income quartiles (2006) 
(base: first quartil) 
Region 
(base: Madrid) 
Age 
(base:under 35) 
Income source Sex 
Self-
Employed 
Type tax 
return 
Intercept 2.019 (0.028) 2.173 (0.029) 2.147 (0.029) 2.175 (0.029) 2.174 (0.029) 2.175 (0.029) 2.176 (0.029) 
∆ log(1-τ) 0.664 (0.037) 1.641 (0.056) 1.118 (0.058) 1.548 (0.029) 1.598 (0.040) 1.501 (0.030) 1.582 (0.033) 
∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-2 0.338 (0.053) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-3 0.701 (0.064) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*quartil-4 2.053 (0.056) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
log(yt-1) -0.211 (0.003) -0.224 (0.003) -0.225 (0.003) -0.225 (0.003) -0.224 (0.003) -0.225 (0.003) -0.225 (0.003) 
∆ log(1-τ)*Andalusia -- -0.188 (0.074) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Aragon -- -0.337 (0.112) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Asturias -- -0.217(*) (0.142) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Balearic Islands -- -0.044(*) (0.133) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Canary Islands -- -0.245 (0.118) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Cantabria -- -0.449 (0.170) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Cast-Mancha -- -0.365 (0.128) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Cast-Leon -- -0.356 (0.093) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Cataluña -- 0.059(*) (0.076) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Extremadura -- -0.374 (0.117) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Galicia -- -0.206 (0.091) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Murcia -- 0.166(*) (0.151) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Rioja -- -0.168(*) (0.215) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*Valencia -- 0.081(*) (0.088) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1- τ)*Ceuta-Melilla -- -0.823 (0.308) -- -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*age35-55 -- -- 0.536 (0.063) -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*age55-65 -- -- 0.472 (0.075) -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*age+65 -- -- 0.470 (0.068) -- -- -- -- 
∆ log(1-τ)*source -- -- -- -1.024 (0.097) -- -- -- 
∆ log(1- τ)*man -- -- -- -- -0.088 (0.044) -- -- 
∆ log(1- τ)*selfemployed -- -- -- -- -- 0.131 (0.055) -- 
∆ log(1- τ )*joint -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.132 (0.046) 
2
k overall signif. (p-value) 7,904.77 (0.00) 6,827.05 (0.00) 6,817.96 (0.00) 6,736.60 (0.00) 6,729.82 (0.00) 6,753.80 (0.00) 6,752.95(0.00) 
Standard error  regression 0.397 0.400 0.399 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 
N 285,272 285,272 285,272 285,272 285,272 285,272 285,272 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. (*) Non significant at 10%. Models include as 
regressors: age and square, joint, self-employed, man, number of children, disabled, source and 
region of residence. 
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Appendix IV. Taxable Income Elasticity Versus Gross Income Elasticity 
 
It is worth noting that the estimated elasticities in this paper are gross income 
elasticities,         , and not taxable income elasticities,         , which are the ones  
traditionally used in empirical work. Consequently, as an essential prior step before 
applying the estimated elasticities to the analysis of tax reform, conversion from our 
estimated values of          to their equivalents          was necessary. In doing so, we 
took into account the existing relationship among gross income, taxable income and the 
net-of-tax rate shown in Figure 1, which allowed us to conclude that both elasticities are 
related in the following way:                      . 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Therefore, to the extent that we can obtain an estimate of     , we will be able to extract 
the value of taxable income elasticity emerging from our estimates of gross income 
elasticities. With this aim, we follow Creedy and Sanz (2010). These authors derive 
analytical expressions for the revenue elasticity to income defined in alternative ways—
gross income, income net of deductible expenditures and taxable income—which allows 
estimating the regionalized value of     as a ratio 
   
    ⁄ . These values of     , 
together with our regionalized estimates of         , allowed us to obtain the elasticities 
of the taxable income included in Table A. IV.1, which were used in the empirical 
exercise. 
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Table A.IV.1. Taxable Income Elasticities derived from Gross Income Elasticities 
reported in the main text 
 
                         
National 0.6519 1.541 1.005 
Andalucia 0.5460 1.453 0.793 
Aragon 0.6148 1.304 0.802 
Principality of Asturias 0.6553 1.424 0.933 
Balearic Islands 0.6503 1.597 1.038 
Canary Islands 0.6137 1.396 0.857 
Cantabria 0.6082 1.192 0.725 
Castilla-Leon 0.5358 1.285 0.688 
Castilla-La Mancha 0.5448 1.276 0.695 
Catalonia 0.6853 1.700 1.165 
Valencia 0.5999 1.722 1.033 
Extremadura 0.4560 1.267 0.578 
Galicia 0.5467 1.435 0.784 
Madrid 0.8089 1.641 1.327 
Murcia 0.5746 1.807 1.038 
La Rioja 0.6238 1.473 0.919 
Ceuta y Melilla 0.6519 0.818 0.533 
* Derived from the revenue elasticities reported by Creedy y Sanz (2010). 
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